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Abstract 
This paper considers the implementation of the cubic public-key transformation, a public-
key cryptographic scheme that requires sending of additional side-information.  A coding 
scheme for the side-information, based on the residue number system, is presented. In the 
conventional one-to-one encryption mapping also, such coding can be used to send 
additional like that of watermarking, which could be used to detect man-in-the-middle 
attacks or used for authentication. 
 
1 Introduction 
Cybersecurity must deal not only with communications security [1]-[8] but also access 
controls, random sequences [9]-[17], secret-sharing [18]-[25], P2P networks [26]-[28], 
and cryptocurrency [29]-[31]. NSF’s National Coordination Office for Networking and 
Information Technology Research and Development has identified “moving target by 
increasing the cost of attack, such as by making the security environment dynamic and 
therefore harder to predict or less susceptible to prolonged attack” as one of the most 
important methods of dealing with potential attackers. It is in that spirit we are 
considering a hybrid system of cryptography that has both public-key encryption as well 
as side-information that needs to be sent. Specifically, we consider the cubic 
transformation [9], which is one-to-one only if additional side-information is sent along 
with the encrypted data.  
In general, a limited many-to-one mapping can be represented by f(mi) = c, ,2i where 
mi are the various messages that lead to the same encrypted sequence c (Figure 1). When 
i=2, we have the basis of oblivious transfer protocol [18],[19].  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. Many-to-one mapping for cryptography using side information of i 
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To convert f(mi) = c, ,2i into a one-to-one mapping, one needs to use it in a slightly 
different form where in addition to c, the correct value of i is also transmitted to the 
recipient as side-information, quite like the piggy bank cryptographic paradigm [19].  
 
 
Figure 2. Inverse mapping  
We consider several examples of the transformation f(mi) = c, i=3, that sheds light on the 
issues involved in an implementation. Specifically, we propose a residue number 
representation of the indexing information. Enhanced indexing can also be used to send 
additional information like that of watermarking, which could be used to detect man-in-
the-middle attacks in standard one-to-one mapping schemes. 
2 Coding indexing information for transformation mod prime 
We propose the use of the residue number system (RNS) to code the indexing 
information which is labeled 0, 1, 2, .. . This will increase the size of the words 
minimally.  Let us assume that the number c is mod s and the index is mod r. Then c,i 
will be mapped to the number T and 
 
 T mod s = c 
 T mod r = i 
 
As example the cubic transformation mod 13 leads to the mapping as in the table below 
(s=13 and r =3): 
 
Table 1: RNS coding scheme with M=13x3=39 
m c=m
3 
c,i indexed c,i in RNS 
1,3,9 1 1,0; 1,1;1,2 27,1,14 
2,5,6 8 8,0;8,1;8,2 21,34,8 
4,10,12 12 12,0;12,1;12,2 12,25,38 
7,8,11 5 5,0;5,1;5,2 18,31,5 
 
As explanation, m=9, leads to the cube 1, which is the third, largest, indexed, therefore, 
with 0, corresponding to 1,2. In RNS mod 39,   this is the unique number 14, which is 
what the transmitted code will be. 
 
c,i mi 
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At the receiver, 14 will be first transformed to 1,2, for which the three cube roots of 1 
will be computed, leading, in turn, to 9 as the message. The general framework is shown 
in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic for the signal flow  
 
Consider message m in ᴢn, with encryption function c = m
3
 mod p, where p=3k+1 is a 
prime and p=3 mod 4. This transformation is not one-to-one for p-1 and 3 have at least 
one common divisor. It is further assumed that 3 divides the Euler’s totient φ(n), but 9 
does not. Thus three different values of m will map to same c. The cube roots are 1, α and 
α2 because if α is a root, so is its square. The three cube roots of 1 may be obtained by 
solving the equation      
                                               α3-1=0     (1) 
Excluding 1 of (1), the other two are obtained by solving α2+α+1=0, which is possible if 
the square root is of √𝑝 − 3 exists. The roots can also be written as α and α2, so the value 
of α may be equivalently expressed as 
                                    α = 
−1+(𝑝−3)
𝑝+1
4
−1−(𝑝−3)
𝑝+1
4
   (2) 
Ensuring p-1 not be divisible by 9, one can get all the three 𝑐
1
3 values by exponentiation  
                 𝑐
1
3 =  {
c
p+2
9    , if φ(p)or (p − 1) mod 9 = 6 
c
2p+1
9   , if φ(p)or (p − 1) mod 9 = 3
 (3) 
m 
i 
c 
i 
c 
m T 
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Figure 4. Communication between Alice and Bob 
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Figure 5. Timing diagram represents communication between Alice and Bob 
 
 Table 2: Communication between Alice and Bob for CT for the case of modulo 
907 
Alice Bob 
Let message m chosen by Alice is 8 
 
After computing {m, mα, mα2} and 
arranging them in an ascending order, she 
assigns index values accordingly for the 
obtained cubic roots {8, 243,692} 
 
Alice computes c=83 𝑚𝑜𝑑 907 =512 
along with for the above computed roots 
and represent these message values in 
RNS based on the index values 
 
Alice finally transmits desired RNS value 
to Bob 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bob computes m value based on the RNS 
value transmitted by Alice 
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3 When the modulus is composite 
Alice chooses large composite number n and publishes it. While decrypting a cipher text 
Bob requires c and rank information along with the publicly published composite number 
n. Now we generalize the previous analysis to apply composite moduli. As in RSA, we 
perform cubic transformation with a composite number n, where n = product of two 
primes p and q. φ(n) (Euler's totient) is product of (p −1) and (q −1) is divisible by 3 but 
not 9.  
   𝑐
1
3 =  {
c
(φ(n))+3
9    , if φ(n) mod 9 = 6 
c
2(φ(n))+3
9   , if φ(𝑛) mod 9 = 3
  (4) 
 
Both Alice and Bob know the factors of n, but the eavesdropper does not. Also, α is 
published for public and factors of φ(n) are private.  Ensuring φ(n) not be divisible by 9, 
one can get all the three 𝑐
1
3 values by exponentiation. 
 
If we consider the example of n= 533, one must first find two of its prime factors p=13 
and q=41. This is done directly by the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), by solving 
α3-1=0 separately for the two moduli 13 and 41.  
 
To find α only one new solution is required. Using the square modulo operation, Alice 
finds the cube roots for αp = {2, 4} and αq = {1} and combining together and applying 
CRT, 
 
α = (𝛼𝑝. 𝑞. ||𝑞||𝑝
−1
+  𝛼𝑞 . 𝑝. ||𝑝||𝑞
−1
) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑞  (5) 
 
where ||p||q=p mod q. Since 13
-1
 mod 41= 19 and 41
-1
 mod 13= 7, α1=42 and α2=329. It is 
assumed that Alice and Bob have chosen in advance to use α = 42. It’s now time for 
Alice to choose a message (m = 8) to Bob. As in the previous case, she finds its 
companions by multiplying it successively by α = 42, thus obtaining {8,254,336}.  
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Figure 6. Communication between Alice and Bob 
 
Table 3: Mapping for message m  
m c = m
3
 c, i indexed c, i in RNS 
1, 42, 165 1 1,0; 1,1; 1,2 1, 534, 1067 
2, 84, 330 8 8,0; 8,1; 8,2 8, 541, 1074 
4, 127, 168 64 64,0; 64,1; 64,2 64, 597, 1130 
8, 254, 336 512 512,0; 512,1; 512,2 512, 1047, 1578 
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Table 4: Communication between Alice and Bob for CT modulo composite 
Alice Bob 
Let message m chosen by Alice is 8 
 
After computing {m, mα, mα2} and 
arranging them in an ascending order, she 
assigns index values accordingly for the 
computed cubic roots {8, 254,336} 
 
Alice computes c=83 𝑚𝑜𝑑 533 =512 along 
with the computed roots and represent these 
message values in RNS based on the index 
values 
 
Alice finally transmits desired RNS value 
to Bob 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bob computes m value based on the RNS 
value transmitted by Alice 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Timing diagram represents communication between Alice and Bob 
 
3.1 Composite number divisible by 9 
When φ(n) is divisible by 9, each number will now have nine cube roots that are the 
solutions of the equation given below: 
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α9 - 1= 0     (6) 
or, equivalently, by solving: 
 
 (α - 1)(α2 + α + 1)(α6 + α3 + 1)= 0  (7) 
The cube roots of 1 can be indexed 1 through 9 by their numerical value. Any message 
needs to be multiplied by the 9 cube roots of 1to find its location in the indexed set of 9 
values. 
 
One of the important criteria to complete cubic transformation is to pick a composite 
number n such that φ(n)  is divisible by 9.  
 
Consider, for example, that n=679. Alice decomposes finds two of its prime factors p=7 
and q=97. By using CRT Alice finally computes 3 roots for αp = {1, 2, 3} and another 3 
roots αq = {1, 2, 4}. 
                            α1    = (1.97.14+1.7.6) mod 679 = 1                        
                            α2    = (2.97.14+1.7.6) mod 679 = 538                         
                             α3    = (3.97.14+1.7.6) mod 679 = 389                    
                            α4    = (1.97.14+2.7.6) mod 679 = 99          
                            α5    = (2.97.14+2.7.6) mod 679 = 2               
                            α6    = (3.97.14+2.7.6) mod 679 = 487                   
                            α7    = (1.97.14+4.7.6) mod 679 = 197                      
                            α8    = (2.97.14+4.7.6) mod 679 = 100                    
                            α9    = (3.97.14+4.7.6) mod 679 = 585   
            
Hence, the 9 roots obtained will be {1, 538, 389, 99, 2, 487, 197, 100, 85}. Let message 
m that Alice wants to send to Bob is 233. Multiplying 233 with above obtained 9 roots 
and arranging them in ascending order, Alice obtains {39, 78, 214, 233, 330, 408, 466, 
505, 600}.   
 
Alice sends c =233
3
 mod 679=246 to Bob. Bob computes m value based on the RNS 
value transmitted by Alice. 
 
Table 5: Mapping for message m performing CT divisibility by 9 modulo φ(n)   
 
m c = m
3
 c, i indexed c, i indexed 
39, 233, 330 246 246,0; 246,1; 246,2 246, 925, 1604 
214, 408, 505 337 337,0; 337,1; 337,2 1695, 337, 1016 
78, 466, 660 610 610,0; 610,1; 610,2 1968, 610, 1289 
 
 
 
  
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Timing diagram represents communication between Alice and Bob 
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Figure 9. Timing diagram represents communication between Alice and Bob 
 
4 Conclusions 
This paper discusses the implementation of the cubic public-key transformation to 
convert it into a one-to-one mapping suitable for message encryption. A coding scheme 
for the side-information, based on the residue number system, is presented and illustrated 
with examples.  
 
The idea of the coded side-information can also be applied to conventional one-to-one 
encryption mapping. Such side-information can then serve as a cover for the encrypted 
message. In such a case, coding can be used to send additional like that of watermarking, 
which could be used to detect man-in-the-middle attacks or for authentication. 
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